Touro Law Review
Volume 14

Number 3

Article 45

1998

Right to Counsel, Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third
Department: People v. Gabriel

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the State and Local
Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
(1998) "Right to Counsel, Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department: People v. Gabriel," Touro
Law Review: Vol. 14: No. 3, Article 45.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol14/iss3/45

This New York State Constitutional Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @
Touro Law Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ Touro Law Center. For more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu.

et al.: Right to Counsel

1116

TOURO LAWREVIEW

[Vol 14

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
THIRD DEPARTMENT
People v. Gabriel' 92
(decided July 31, 1997)
Defendant, Duane M. Gabriel, was convicted of the second

degree murders of Robert Hathaway and his son, Michael
Hathaway, two counts of grand larceny in the fourth degree and
three counts of petit larceny.193

Defendant was sentenced to

consecutive terms of twenty-five years to life for each murder,
consecutive one and one-third to four years terms for each grand
larceny conviction and to concurrent one-year sentences for each

petit larceny convictions."
Gabriel appealed his convictions claiming that these convictions
violated his right to counsel under the United States

192 661 N.Y.S.2d 306 (3d Dep't 1997), appeal denied, 91 N.Y.2d 892
(1998).
193 Id. at 308. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1996). This section
provides in relevant part that "[a] person is guilty of murder in the second
degree when: 1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the
death of such person or of a third person . . . ." Id. N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 155.30 (McKinney 1996). This section provides in pertinent part that:
A person is guilty of grand larceny in the fourth degree when
he steals property and when:
1. The value of the property exceeds one thousand dollars; or

5. The property, regardless of its nature and value, is
obtained from the person of another; or...
7. The property consists of one of more firearms, rifles of
shotguns as such terms are defined in section 265 of this
chapter; or
8. The value of the property exceeds one hundred dollars and
the property consists of a motor vehicle ....
Id. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 155.25 (McKinney 1996). This section provides in
relevant part that "[a] person is guilty of petit larceny when he steals
property." Id.
194 Gabriel, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 308.
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Constitution, 95 the New York State Constitution," and New
York State statute." 9 Gabriel claimed that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel in two ways. First, Gabriel
claimed that since one of his two defense attorneys was a former

acquaintance of the victim, Robert Hathaway's brother, there
existed a possible conflict of interest.'
Second, defendant
claimed that he was generally denied effective assistance of
counsel." 9 The Appellate Division affirmed the defendant's
convictions holding that defendant's "unequivocal reaffirmation"
of the attorney four months prior to trial, despite the alleged
conflict, and the "vigorous representation" by both defense
counsel did not warrant reversal of Gabriel's convictions.'
On September 19, 1994, the 16 year old defendant, Duane M.
Gabriel, skipped school and was alone in the Hathaway home
where he had resided since July 1994."
Gabriel testified that
Robert Hathaway returned home and began to harass him about

'95

U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law,
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and
to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.

Id.
196 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This section provides in relevant part: "In any
trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and
defend in person and with counsel as in civil actions and shall be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation and be confronted with the witnesses
against him." Id.
19 N.Y. CRni. PRoc. LAw § 210.15(2) (McKinney 1996). This section
provides in relevant part that "the defendant has a right to the aid of counsel at
the arraignment and at every subsequent stage of the action." Id.
198Gabriel, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 309.
9 Id. at 310.
W Id.
201 Id. at 307.
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"[messing] up the family. "2
Defendant, angered by this
harassment, retrieved a .22 caliber rifle and shot Robert
Hathaway once in the back. 2 3 The rifle malfunctioned on the
second shot so Gabriel retrieved and loaded a 12-gauge shotgun
and fired several additional shots into Robert Hathaway. 0 4
Shortly thereafter, Michael Hathaway returned home and was
lured into the basement, where defendant shot and killed him.2 5
Gabriel then removed twenty-four dollars and car keys from
Michael Hathaway's body.
Next, Gabriel stole some jewelry
from the house, packed his clothes and fled in the Hathaway's
car.2
Gabriel hid one gun under a friend's porch. 2 ' He
distributed the stolen jewelry among his friends and disposed of
the victims' automobile by pushing it off a nearby cliff.20 9
Several months prior to trial, one of Gabriel's attorneys
received a telephone call from Robert Hathaway's brother, a
former acquaintance, that made him conscious of a possible
conflict with his continued representation of Gabriel. 20 The
attorney immediately notified the court, the prosecution and the
defendant.211 The trial court conducted a conference regarding
the possible conflict four months prior to trial.2 2 During this
conference, the defendant "unequivocally advised the court that,
despite co-counsel's prior relationship with the victims' family
member, he wanted counsel to continue representing him. ,213

' Id. Gabriel testified that Robert Hathaway appeared drunk, however,
"autopsy results contradicted this .... " Id.
203 Id.
2 Id.
205

at 307-08.

1 d.at 308.
2 Id.
2
7 Id.
2W

id.

m Id.

210 Id. at 309-10.
212
212

Id. at 309.
Id. at 310.

213

Id.
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The Appellate Division, relying on People v. Gomberg214 and
People v. Lombardo,15 concluded that it was unnecessary for the
trial court to hold a hearing concerning the alleged conflict of
interest of Gabriel's attorney. 6 In Gomberg, the New York
Court of Appeals held that the right of an accused to the
assistance of counsel, guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, the
State Constitution and by state statute, may be impaired when
"one lawyer simultaneously represents the conflicting interests of
a number of defendants." 2 7 Accordingly, a trial court must
ascertain that the defendant's choice to continue with the lawyer
is an informed choice.218 Equally, a court may inquire into
whether the attorney himself perceives and appreciates the risk
posed by a possible conflict.21 9 Similarly, in People v.
Lombardo2' the defendant's lawyer had previously represented
the prosecution's key witness." Although the trial court failed
to hold a hearing on the issue of a possible conflict, the New
York Court of Appeals held that where the potential for conflict
exists, the principals of People v. Gomberg apply.222
The Gabriel court concluded that since the lawyer's alleged
conflict involved neither a joint representation of a co-defendant
nor former legal representation of a witness a Gomberg-style
hearing was not required. 23 The Gabriel trial court, however,
held a Gomberg-hearing wherein the defendant affirmed his
selection of trial counsel.224
38 N.Y.2d 307, 342 N.E.2d 550, 379 N.Y.S.2d 769 (1975) (holding that
a trial court has a duty to inquire into the defendants decision to continue with
an attorney that represents more than one defendant in the same trial).
215 61 N.Y.2d 97, 460 N.E.2d 1074, 472 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1984) (holding that
a trial court has duty to inquire into a defendants choice to continue with an
attorney who has previously represented a key witness for the prosecution).
216 Gabriel, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 310.
217 Gomberg, 38 N.Y.2d at 312, 342 N.E.2d at 553, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 773.
218 Id. at 313, 342 N.E.2d at 554, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 774.
214

219

Id.

22 61 N.Y.2d 97, 460 N.E.2d 1074, 472 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1984).
221

Id. at 102, 460 N.E.2d at 1075, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 590.

2n2Id.
I Gabriel, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 310.
22 4

Id.
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Moreover the Appellate Division believed that "the aggressive
representation by both attorneys" did not warrant reversal of
Gabriel's conviction."
In reaching this conclusion the court
again relied upon People v. Lombardo.26 The Lombardo court
stated that where a defendant has not "demonstrated 'that a
conflict of interests, or at least a significant possibility thereof,
did exist ...the defendant is not entitled to a reversal of his
conviction."2 7 The Lombardo court remarked that an analysis
of the attorney's searching cross-examination of the witness
demonstrated that the attorney operated on the premise that he
"no longer owed the witness any professional obligation."22'
The New York Court of Appeals in People v. Baldi 29 noted
that "the most critical concern... is to avoid both confusing true
ineffectiveness with mere losing tactics and according undue
significance to retrospective analysis."" The court held that an
attorney's effectiveness should be evaluated under two different
standards.23' First, "whether the attorneys shortcomings were
such as to render the 'trial a farce and a mockery of justice"' 2
= Id.

61 N.Y.2d 97, 460 N.E.2d 1074, 472 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1984).
Id. at 103, 460 N.E.2d at 1076, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 591 (citing People v.
Macerola, 47 N.Y.2d 257, 264, 391 N.E.2d 990, 995, 417 N.Y.S.2d 908,
913 (1979)).
228 Lombardo, 61 N.Y.S.2d at 103, 460 N.E.2d at 1076, 472 N.Y.S.2d at
591. See also People v. Medina, 208 A.D.2d 974, 617 N.Y.S.2d 230 (3rd
Dep't 1994) (holding that the defendant's right to be present at all material
stages of trial was not violated when trial court conferred with attorneys, outside
defendant's presence, about the possibility that defense counsel's prior
representation of chief prosecution witness created impermissible conflict of
interest).
229 54 N.Y.2d 137, 429 N.E.2d 400, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1981) (holding that
the defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel where his attorney
failed to pursue a claim of actual innocence when faced with the strong
possibility
that the defendant was legally insane).
210
Id.at 146, 429 N.E.2d at 405, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
2 Id. at 146, 429 N.E.2d at 404, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 897.
232 Id. (citing People v. Aiken, 45 N.Y.2d 394, 398, 380 N.E.2d 272, 408
N.Y.S.2d 444 (1978) (quoting People v. Brown, 7 N.Y.2d 359, 361, 165
N.E.2d 551, 197 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1960)). The Brown court found that defense
counsel's negligence or error in judgement for failing to call a key witness did
226

227
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and second "'whether the attorney exhibited reasonable
competence.' " 233 The Gabriel court concluded "that the
defendant was represented by two well-prepared and experienced
criminal attorneys [who] mounted a collaborative, albeit
unsuccessful, defense."
The court was completely satisfied
that Gabriel was provided meaningful representation.l
Both the Federal and New York State Constitutions require that
a criminal defendant be given meaningful representation by
counsel at trial. This requirement includes the obligation that a
defendant's lawyer be free from conflicting loyalties and
obligations at trial. At a minimum, the Federal and State
Constitutions require that the defendant make an informed choice
when presented with a potential conflict. In Gabriel, the
Appellate Division was "eminently satisfied" that defendant
received effective assistance from both attorneys and that the trial

not render the trial a farce or mockery of justice. Id. at 361, 165 N.E.2d at
558, 197 N.Y.S.2d at 707. See also People v. Bennett, 29 N.Y.2d 462, 467,
280 N.E.2d 637, 329 N.Y.S.2d 801(1972) (holding that representation of
defendant by his assigned lawyer was so inadequate and ineffective as to deprive
defendant of fair trial where there was a complete lack of investigation or
preparation on issue of defendant's insanity, which was only possible defense
available to defendant).
233 Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d at 146, 429 N.E.2d at 405, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 898. See,
e.g., United States v. Fessel, 351 F.2d 1275, 1279 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding
that a defense attorney's failure to request a court appointed psychiatrist to aid
in the presentation of an insanity defense "denied the accused services
necessary to the preparation and presentation of an adequate defense, and thus
denied the defendant minimally effective representation.... ."). See also
United States v. Elksnis, 528 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that
entrapment instructions did not establish incompetence of counsel on the theory
that instructions served to confuse jury and failed to properly instruct jury on the
issue of intent); United States v. Toney, 527 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding
that the test for effective assistance of counsel is whether counsel is reasonably
likely to render and does render reasonably effective assistance); United States
v. De Coster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. 1973) (holding that when counsel's choices
are uninformed because of inadequate preparation, a defendant is denied the
effective assistance of counsel).
I People v. Gabriel, 661 N.Y.S.2d 306, 310 (3d Dep't 1997).
235 Id.
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court went beyond constitutional requirements in holding a
Gomberg-style hearing four months prior to trial. f6
People v. Himko 23'
(decided May 8, 1997)
Defendant, Andrew J. Himko, was convicted in 1996 following a
jury trial of depraved indifference murder238 and attempted
murder 239 in the second degree.24 Defendant was sentenced to
consecutive terms of incarceration of 20 years to life for the
conviction of murder in the second degree and 5 to 15 years for the
conviction of attempted murder in the second degree. 24' Defendant
appealed his conviction, claiming that the verdict should be set
aside on the grounds that the County Court was required to inform
the defendant of his right to proceed pro se242.
The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed the trial
court's conviction. 243 With respect to the defendant's contention
that the County Court was required to inform the defendant of his
right to proceed pro se, the court held that "the County Court was
under no obligation, constitutional or otherwise, to inform the
244
defendant of this right."
236

Id.
237 657 N.Y.S.2d 127 (3d Dep't), appeal denied, 90 N.Y.2d 906, 686
N.E.2d 230, 663 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1997).
238Id. at 128. The New York Statute for murder in the second degree is
embodied in N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.25 (McKinney 1986).
244 Id. The New York Statute for attempted murder in the second degree is
embodied in N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.30 (McKinney 1986).
240 Id.
241id.
242
243

Id.

id.

244 Id. (citing People v. McIntyre, 36 N.Y.2d 10, 324 N.E.2d 322, 364

N.Y.S.2d 837 (1974) (holding that a defendant's outburst due to the trial court's
denial of his motion to proceed pro se and from a belittling inquiry by the trial
judge to an otherwise legal applicant was unjustified and the defendant should
have been allowed to proceed pro se); People v. Burton, 106 A.D.2d 652, 482
N.Y.S.2d 909 (2d Dep't 1994) (holding that when a criminal defendant requests
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